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Goals vs. Deadlines: Notes on the VA
Disability Claims Backlog
Daniel L. Nagin
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 50
ABSTRACT
Drawing primarily on policy considerations, social science research, and the relevant
statutory and doctrinal frameworks within veterans benefits law, this article argues
that Congress should subject the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to a clear
and enforceable deadline for making initial eligibility determinations on claims for
service-connected compensation. Despite widespread media coverage of delays in
VA’s adjudication system and countless oversight hearings and congressional
proposals for reform, this simple idea – to impose a hard deadline upon VA has
either been overlooked entirely or drowned out by a preoccupation with other types
of legislative responses to the VA claims backlog. This article seeks to enter the
debate about remedying the backlog from a slightly different vantage point than the
perspectives used to date, one that focuses on the nature of deadlines – including the
psychology of deadlines, the enforcement of deadlines, and the role deadlines might
play in promoting perceptions of agency fairness and legitimacy. Along the way, the
article draws on VA’s own data to reveal the long-standing gap between the agency’s
timeliness goals and its performance. The reform proposed here is admittedly modest
in many respects; it is far from a cure all for delay. But it does reflect certain
fundamental values that should animate any reforms to the VA system: expanding
enforcement tools, applying lessons learned from past VA failures, and treating
veterans with dignity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

P

icture an infantryman who has served two tours of duty, one in
Iraq and one in Afghanistan.1 He has borne the burdens of war in
countless ways—by risking life and limb for his country, by absorbing
the mental stresses of multiple combat deployments, and by enduring
separation from his family and community.2 The soldier recently
completed his term of enlistment and received an honorable discharge
from the Army. He returned to his home community—it could be any
community, but, for our purposes, let’s say it’s in Massachusetts3—
and tried to resume civilian life as best he could. But, like so many
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, returning from war, he had

1

2

3

Multiple deployments are one of the hallmarks of these recent conflicts. See
generally VANESSA WILLIAMSON & ERIN MULHALL, INVISIBLE WOUNDS—
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES CONFRONT A NEW GENERATION
OF VETERANS 6 (2009); Thom Shanker, Army is Worried of Rising Stress of
Return Tours to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008
/04/06/washington/06military.html. This vignette is a composite drawn from
some of the client advocacy undertaken at the Veterans Legal Clinic of the
Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School. The Clinic provides pro bono
representation to veterans who have unmet civil legal assistance needs. For an
example of the Clinic’s work advocating on behalf of a veteran who completed
multiple combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Ausmer v. Shinseki,
26 Vet. App. 392, 395 (2013) (applying, in a case of first impression that cited
the veteran’s difficulty readjusting to civilian life, the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act to allow an otherwise untimely disability benefits appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to proceed on the merits).
The example provided here happens to involve a male veteran. But it could just
as easily involve a female veteran. Women make up an increasingly significant
percentage of the active duty and veteran populations. See generally U.S. DEP’T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS,
AMERICA’S WOMEN VETERANS: MILITARY SERVICE HISTORY AND VA BENEFIT
UTILIZATION STATISTICS 3, 8 (2011)(stating that by 2035 women will make up
15 percent of all living veterans); Joe Burris, Fort Meade VA Outpatient Clinic
Advances Effort To Serve Women Veterans, BALTIMORE SUN, March 24, 2013,
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-24/news/bs-md-ar-fortmeade-clinic-20130321_1_women-veterans-mental-health-clinics-millionclinic.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 340
(2012). There were nearly 400,000 veterans living in Massachusetts as of 2012;
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran
_Population.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
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difficulty adjusting.4 The process of reintegrating into civilian life is
not easy, and it is not linear.
Depending on circumstances, each individual may suffer from the
visible, physical wounds of war or the invisible wounds of war or
both.5 All of these wounds require diagnosis, treatment, and support
systems of various kinds in order for healing to occur.6 And then there
are the newly strange rhythms of civilian life that must also be
negotiated.7 Absent for the first time in a long while are the structure
of military life, the mission-oriented focus, and the daily bonds forged
with fellow servicemembers pursuing a common goal.8 Because of
these and other challenges, the term “reintegration”—the Army’s
chosen vocabulary—is an imperfect concept for capturing the
complexity of returning from war.9
As for this particular veteran returning home to Massachusetts,
imagine that the barriers he encountered upon his return home also
have a financial dimension.10 The veteran—who was given a clean bill

4

5

6
7

8
9

10

Of course, the burden of “adjusting” to civilian life is not—and should not—be
seen as solely falling on the shoulders of returning servicemembers. See
Sebastian Junger, U.S. Veterans Need to Share the Moral Burden of War,
WASH. POST, May 24, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/sebastian
-junger-us-veterans-need-to-share-the-moral-burden-of-war/2013/05/24
/726d7576-c3b9-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html.
See generally INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE
INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY (Territa
Nielian and Lisa H. Jaycox, eds., 2008).
Id.
Ann Demers, When Veterans Return: The Role of Community in Reintegration,
16 JOURNAL OF LOSS AND TRAUMA: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRESS
& COPING 2 (2011).
Id.
Army Community Service , Rear Detachment Commander Computer-Based
Training: Module 23: Redeployment, Reunion, and Reintegration, available at
https://www.myarmyonesource.com/skins/aos2/q_mod_2a285ab0-5db1-4f369b91-f2263c973c32/q_act_download_resource/q_cat_40198439-d625-475a8bea-d2b4cb797b34/q_obj_adf8a600-bbfe-4f4a-87d9-617082d8ff3a/display
.aspx?ignoretimeout=true. (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). For a searing account of
the challenges servicemembers face when they return from war, see DAVID
FINKEL, THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE (2013).
A. GLASMEIER ET AL., THE CURRENT AND FUTURE LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS OF
MASSACHUSETTS VETERANS 45 (2013) (stating approximately one fifth of all
veterans in Massachusetts living at or below 200% of the Federal Poverty
Level).
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of health during his Army exit medical exam—did his best to get back
to work in the civilian world, but has been unable to find employment
that suits him. Nothing seemed right. Instead of feeling more
acclimated each week to being home, each week he felt more ill at
ease. He was not sleeping much—and he was experiencing increased
anxiety and hyper-vigilance. These stresses were compounded by
deepening financial pressures. At the moment, the veteran—who is
unmarried—has no income and is relying on support from extended
family and friends. A friend, also a veteran, urges the veteran to
receive mental health treatment and tells him he may have PostTraumatic Stress.
As the veteran seeks out care, he finds himself meeting with an
advocate to obtain guidance about his potential eligibility for various
benefit programs and financial assistance. As for access to healthcare,
the advocate and veteran discuss his options. The veteran states that he
would prefer to see a local doctor with whom he had an existing
relationship before his military service—and who is not affiliated with
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The advocate therefore
provides information about the veteran’s eligibility for healthcare
coverage through the MassHealth program. As for financial assistance,
the advocate and the veteran discuss various programs, including,
among other things, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) administered by the Massachusetts Department of
Transitional Assistance; the Emergency Aid to Elders, Disabled and
Children (EADC) program, also administered by the Massachusetts
Department of Transitional Assistance; the Veterans’ Services
Benefits program administered by the Massachusetts Department of
Veterans’ Services; and the service-connected disability compensation
program administered by the Veterans Benefits Administration of the
VA.11
During the course of the discussion, the veteran asks a very simple
and straightforward question that reflects his urgent need for financial
assistance. The question is this: assuming that he applies to one or
more of these programs, how quickly will he receive a decision
approving or denying him benefits? The advocate answers that the
deadlines are clear—but they vary by program. The advocate proceeds
to explain that: (1) for the MassHealth program, the agency is required
11

Veterans’ Compensation for Service-Connected Disabilities, BENEFITS.GOV,
http://www.benefits.gov/benefits/benefit-details/289 (last visited Sept. 19,
2014).
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to make a decision within either forty-five days for most applications,
or ninety days for applications citing disability as the basis for
eligibility;12 (2) for the SNAP program, the agency is required to make
a decision within thirty days;13 (3) for the EADC program, the agency
is required to make a decision within thirty days;14 (4) and for the
Veterans Services’ Benefits program, the local agency is required to
make a provisional decision within ten business days.15
When the discussion turns to the VA service-connected disability
compensation program, however, there is a very different response.
The advocate tells the veteran that there is really no answer at all.
VA’s service-connected disability compensation program, unlike all of
the other aforementioned programs, is not subject to any statutory or
regulatory deadline for making initial eligibility determinations.16
The veteran next asks—mindful of the frequent media reports he
has seen recently about a VA claims backlog and veterans waiting
months and months, if not years, to receive a decision on a claim—
how long, on average, it actually takes for VA to make an initial
eligibility decision on a service-connected disability compensation
claim? He is told that, as of January 2014, the answer is roughly six
months—much longer than the deadlines for any of the other programs
about which the veteran has inquired.17

12
13

14
15

16

17

130 MASS. CODE REGS. § 516.004 (2014). .
106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 361.700 (2014); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g) (2012). Certain
applicants are entitled to “expedited” Food Stamps and must receive a decision
on their application within seven days; 106 C.M.R. § 365.800 (2014); 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.2(i) (2012).
106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 702.160(A) (2014).
108 MASS. CODE REGS. § 4.02(5) (2014). The regulation requires that, within ten
working days of an application being submitted, the local Veterans Services
Officer (VSO) send the completed application, together with a recommendation
for approval or denial, to the Department of Veterans’ Services (DVS). Note,
however, that the regulation does not specify a time period by which DVS must
accept or reject the VSO’s recommendation. Based on the experience of the
Veterans Legal Clinic, in practice DVS accepts or rejects the VSO’s
recommendation very soon thereafter.
Vietnam Veterans of America v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(“Congress has not, however, enacted any statutory deadlines that would require
the VA to adjudicate all disability claims within a definite time period.”).
VA MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS (January 11, 2014) available at http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS
/detailed_claims_data.asp. (stating that, as of January 11, 2014, the figure was
175.2 days); Allison Hickey, Balancing the Record on the Claims Backlog,
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The veteran then wonders, how is it that he is entitled to an
eligibility decision within a defined time period for all of these other
programs, but not for VA benefits? How is it that the federal agency
charged with caring for veterans—and whose mission is “[t]o fulfill
President Lincoln’s promise ‘To care for him who shall have borne the
battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by serving and honoring the
men and women who are America’s Veterans”18—is subject to no
deadline whatsoever for making an initial decision on his claim for
service-connected benefits?
This short essay, which expands on a talk delivered at the Veterans
and the Law Symposium at the University of Massachusetts School of
Law, uses this vignette as a jumping off point to argue that this should
not be so. Drawing primarily on policy considerations, social science
research, and the relevant statutory and doctrinal frameworks within
veterans benefits law, this essay argues that Congress should subject
VA to a clear and enforceable deadline—somewhere between 90 and
125 days—for making initial eligibility determinations on claims for
service-connected compensation. Despite widespread media coverage
of delays in VA’s adjudication system and countless oversight
hearings and congressional proposals for reform, this simple idea—to
impose a hard deadline upon VA has either been overlooked entirely
or drowned out by a preoccupation with other types of legislative
responses.19

18

19

VANTAGE POINT: DISPATCHES FROM THE U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
(March 19, 2013) available at http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/8995
/balancing-the-record-on-the-claims-backlog/ (reflecting that, as recently as
March 2013, the answer would have been nearly 100 days longer — 273 days
on average); see infra Section III for a fuller discussion of VA’s struggle to
reduce the wait veterans must endure after filing an initial claim for serviceconnected disability compensation benefits.
U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp
(last visited May 7, 2014).
For an early voice seeking the imposition of statutory deadlines, see Battling the
Backlog: Challenges Facing the VA Claims Adjudication and Appeal Process:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. 40-42
(2005) (statement of Robert V. Chisholm, President, National Organization of
Veterans Advocates)(stating that there “are no deadlines imposed on the VA to
complete any of the steps in the adjudication of a claim” and urging Congress to
“impose mandatory timeframes for each step in the VA adjudication process.”).
One academic article that discusses numerous potential reforms to VA’s
adjudication process also briefly addresses the utility of imposing a statutory
deadline for deciding initial claims. Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification,
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As discussed more fully below, imposing such a statutory deadline
upon VA is a potentially useful reform because, among other things, it
will: (1) enshrine in law VA’s duty to provide veterans with timely
eligibility decisions, as opposed to leaving timeliness to agency
prerogative; (2) incentivize VA to extend, and then reinforce against
future unknown contingencies, the recent progress it has made in
reducing the claims backlog; (3) enhance political and judicial
mechanisms for enforcement; and (4) accord veterans a greater
measure of dignity during, and confidence in, the VA claims process.
To be clear, the purpose of this essay is not to analyze in depth the
causes of the VA backlog, its consequences, or the myriad ongoing
and potential reforms to VA’s internal processing systems. These
topics have been addressed extensively elsewhere at various levels of
detail.20 Nor are the ideas offered here proposed as a kind of panacea
for VA’s woes. Solving VA’s systemic challenges requires insights
and reforms from multiple disciplines and perspectives, and massive
change implemented over an extended period of time. Rather, the
limited purpose here is to enter the debate about remedying the
backlog from a slightly different starting point, one that focuses on the
nature of deadlines—including the psychology of deadlines, the
enforcement of deadlines, and the role deadlines might play in
promoting perceptions of agency fairness and legitimacy. Along the

20

or Transformation? The Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs
Disability Benefits Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify,
Rather than Maintain or Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR.
B.J. 1, 13 (2008). As for Congress, one House bill does propose that VA be
required to provisionally approve all initial claims not decided within 125 days.
H.R. 1739, 113th Cong. (2013). However, to date, that bill has been languishing
without any action since the day it was introduced, a period of well over a year.
See, e.g., A 21st Century System for Evaluating Veterans for Disability Benefits
(Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007) (discussing potential reforms within VA’s
disability benefit system); The Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation
Enduring Freedom on the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Claims Process:
Hearing Before the Subcomm, on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, of
the H. Comm. On Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 48-51 (2007) (statement of
Linda J. Bilmes, Faculty, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)
available
at
http://veterans.house.gov/hearing-transcript/the-impact-ofoperation-iraqi-freedomoperation-enduring-freedom-on-the-us) (recommending,
among other things, that in order to address systemic delays in adjudication
processes VA should (1) grant all claims when filed and then audit, in manner
akin to the IRS, a sampling of the claims to review for accuracy and (2) should
simplify the disability rating categories to yield four basic levels of disability).
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way, the essay draws on VA’s own data to reveal the long-standing
gap between the agency’s timeliness goals and its performance.
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview
of the service-connected disability compensation program. Part III
explores the nature of the VA backlog. Part IV argues that externally
imposed deadlines can be more effective than internally imposed
deadlines, specifically in the context of VA service-connected
compensation benefits. Part V discusses questions of enforcement. Part
VI explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of imposing a
deadline upon VA, with particular emphasis on how a deadline might
affect veterans’ assessment of procedural justice at VA. Part VII
concludes.
II. THE SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM
While the roots of the service-connected disability compensation
program stretch back to the nation’s founding, the modern version of
the program has its origins in World War I. In 1917, Congress
amended the War Risk Insurance Act to allow veterans who incurred
injuries, or aggravated pre-existing injuries, in the line of duty to
receive ongoing payment as compensation, based on the severity of
those injuries and the average loss of civilian occupational earning
capacity.21 The current iteration of the program—the serviceconnected disability compensation program—retains these basic
elements.22 Today, for an unmarried veteran without dependents,
compensation payments range from $130.94 per month (for disabilities
rated as impairing civilian occupational earning power by 10%) to

21

22

War Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 65-20, S. 2133, 40 Stat. 102 (June 12,
1917); Pub. L. No. 65-90, H.R. 5723, 40 Stat. 398 (October 6, 1917); see also
James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The Origins of the
Modern Veterans’ Benefits System from 1914 to 1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 1
(2013) (discussing the history of the veterans benefits program); James D.
Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135 (2011).
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans, Dependents and
Survivors: Chapter 2 Service-connected Disabilities, available at,
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/benefits_chap02.asp
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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$2,858.24 per month (for disabilities rated as impairing civilian
occupational earning power by 100%).23
The program is both enormous in scope and enormous in
importance to veterans with service-connected disabilities. Last year,
over 3.7 million veterans received service-connected compensation
from VA.24 In terms of the amount of total service-connected
compensation paid by VA, the most recent public data, from fiscal
year 2012, shows that VA provided over $44 billion in compensation,
or $12,542 per eligible veteran.25 Such payments play a significant role
in ensuring that veterans who have lost earning capacity because of a
service-connected disability can maintain financial stability and
receive compensation—and recognition—for their sacrifice.
While there are altogether five steps before VA can issue serviceconnected disability compensation benefits to a claimant, there are
three basic eligibility requirements at the outset: (1) status as a veteran;
(2) existence of a current disability; and (3) a connection between the
veteran’s service and the disability.26 Once these three requirements
are met, VA must then (4) assign a rating to the disability—that is,
determine the severity of the disability according to the standards set
forth in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities.27 Finally, VA must (5)
determine the effective date of the claim—that is, determine as of what
date the entitlement to compensation arose.28 This five-step process

23

24

25
26
27

28

38 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1114 (2014). It is important to note that the increases in
payment are not proportional to the rating percentage increase. For example, the
present difference in compensation between a disability rated 10% disabling and
20% disabling is $130 vs. $258. Whereas the difference between a disability
rated 90% disabling and 100% disabling is $1,714 vs. $2,858. For this reason, it
can be especially important to ensure that veterans entitled to a 100% disability
rating receive such a rating from VA. In addition, VA must pay higher monthly
rates (known as “special monthly compensation’’) to disabled veterans with
certain specific, very severe disabilities or combinations of disabilities.
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
I, 11 (2013).
Id.
Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006).
As described above, the rating assigned to the disability corresponds to a
particular level of monthly monetary compensation. 38 U.S.C. § 155 (West
2014); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 38 CFR Book C,
Schedule for Rating Disabilities, WEB AUTOMATED REFERENCE MATERIAL
SYSTEM (Feb. 27, 2014) http://www.benefits.va.gov/warms/bookc.asp.
38 U.S.C. § 5110 (West 2014).
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may seem simple. It is anything but. Each step—even a topic as
seemingly innocuous as the very first step, which determines who
meets the definition of a veteran29—is marked by enormous
complexity.30
III. THE VA BACKLOG
A. Defining the Backlog
Concerns about delays in the processing of claims at VA are
nothing new.31 However, these concerns have become much more
intense and highly publicized over the last five years. What was once a
relatively arcane subject became the focus of front page news,32

29

See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, ch. 3 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B.
Abrams eds., 2013) (providing an overview of the eligibility requirements for
service-connected disability compensation benefits).

30

See Robert N. Davis, Veterans Fighting Wars at Home and Abroad, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 389 (2013) (discussing the needs of disabled veterans and the
veterans benefit adjudication system); James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’
Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New Complexities of
Veterans Benefits System, 66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 251 (2010)
(discussing some of the inherent complexity in the existing system); William L.
Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA’s Regulation
Rewrite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (2009); and William A. Moorman &
William F. Russo, Serving our Veterans Through Clearer Rules, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 207 (2004). A sense of the program’s complexity is reflected in the current
2204-page edition of the VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL (Barton F. Stichman &
Ronald B. Abrams eds., 2013), which is the desk bible for those who advocate
for veterans within the VA adjudication system and on judicial review. Even the
question of what constitutes a “claim” for VA benefits is not without dispute.
See, e.g., Cacciola v. Gibson, 27 Vet.App. 45, 53 n. 2 (2014) (“Although there
have been efforts to definitively define what is and is not a ‘claim,’ such efforts
have not produced uniformity”).
See, e.g., VA BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CLAIMS PROCESSING, PROPOSALS TO
IMPROVE DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING IN THE VETERANS BENEFIT
ADMINISTRATION, 3 (1993) (stating that panel was established by the VA Under
Secretary for benefits to “develop recommendations to shorten the time it takes
to make decisions on disability claims and reduce the backlog of claims which
has reached critical levels at many VBA regional offices”).
See, e.g., James Dao, Veterans Wait for Benefits as Claims Pile Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2012 at A1.

31

32
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editorials,33 investigative reporting,34 and a recurring topic on a cable
television comedy show.35 What once required lengthy explanations,
now simply became known in the media and popular culture by its
three-word shorthand: the VA backlog.
The current backlog at VA has its source in a number of factors,
which combined to create a perfect storm that overwhelmed the
agency and markedly drove up the time it took to decide claims over
the last few years. A full excavation of the causes of the backlog is
beyond the scope of this essay. For the moment, it is sufficient to note,
in general terms, that VA ascribed the backlog to overlapping forces
related to increased access to, and increased demand for, benefits. On
the access side, VA has cited: greater awareness among the veterans
community about VA benefits via social media; improved VA
community outreach efforts; expanding numbers of medical conditions
that are presumed by law to be service-connected; and more effective
use of a VA and Department of Defense program that facilitates the
submission of disability applications prior to discharge from military
service.36 On the demand side, VA has cited: the toll of the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars, the increased survival rates of servicemembers
because of advances in medicine and battlefield protection, and the
draw down from those conflicts; an aging population of veterans from
earlier conflicts whose health is deteriorating; the recession that hit at
the end of the first decade of the 21st century; and increasing
complexity in deciding claims based on the average number of medical
conditions contained in each claim.37 Other factors that have been

33

34

35

36
37

See, e.g., Editorial, VA backlog fails ailing veterans: Our view, USA TODAY,
Aug. 21, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21
/va-veterans-disability-claims-backlog-editorials-debates/2683167/.
See, e.g., Aaron Glantz, VA Backs Off Promise to Fix Veterans’ Claims Backlog,
THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, (May 22, 2013)
http://cironline.org/reports/va-backs-promise-fix-veterans-claim-backlog-4571.
See, e.g., The Daily Show: America’s Heroes Return—Operation Enduring Wait
(Comedy Central Television Broadcast, May 20, 2013).
See infra notes 37 and 38.
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., PART II, 5, 85 (2013). For further background about the addition of
medical conditions—including ischemic heart disease, Parkinson’s disease,
hairy cell leukemia and other types of chronic B-cell leukemia—to the list of
conditions that are presumptively service-connected for Agent Orange exposure,
see 75 Fed. Reg. 53, 202 (Aug. 31, 2010); see also VA CLAIMS PROCESSING
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cited include internal VA challenges, such as delays accessing
pertinent records held by other government agencies and processrelated and technological inefficiencies.38 Finally—and independent of
these specific access, demand, and related considerations—the sheer
complexity of veterans benefits in general no doubt plays an important
role in the backlog too.39
While the VA backlog has attracted considerable attention, its
precise meaning has proven more slippery. This slipperiness has two
dimensions. First, what types of claims and what stages of the
adjudication process should be included in the discussion of delays at
VA? Second, when should a claim, assuming it is being considered in
the assessment of delays at VA, be denoted as “backlogged?”
As to the first question, even within the category of serviceconnected disability compensation claims, there are multiple subcategories of claims that may or may not be entitled to the same level
of concern in evaluating processing delays at VA.40 For example, one
might attach different weight to timeliness concerns with respect to

38

39

40

TASK FORCE, REP. TO THE SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 3, 10 (2001) (citing
complexity as part of explanation of backlog in 2001).
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: CHALLENGES TO TIMELY PROCESSING
PERSIST, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY GAO-13-453T
2 (March 13, 2013) ; see A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING VETERANS
FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 169-80 (Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing some of the factors contributing to processing delays at VA as of
2007); see Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, or Transformation? The
Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits
Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify, Rather than Maintain
or Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2008)
(discussing the factors contributing to the backlog as of 2009, including
proposed reforms); THE VA CLAIMS BACKLOG WORKING GROUP REPORT (Mar.
2014) (discussing the factors contributing to processing delays at VA as of
2014); Emily Woodward Deutsch and Terrence T. Griffin, Parsing the
Paperless Push: A Study of the Latest Efforts to Automate the Veterans’ Claims
Process, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 117 (2010) (discussing the challenges of
technological change at VA); Emily Woodward Deutsch & Michael Donohue,
The Role of the New Media in the Veterans Benefits Arena, 1 VETERANS L. REV.
183 (2009).
See, e.g., VA CLAIMS PROCESSING TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS 3, 10 (2001) (citing complexity as part of explanation of
backlog in 2001).
See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL 933-55 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B.
Abrams eds., 2013) (discussing the various claim types within the serviceconnected disability compensation system).
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decisions on initial claims for service-connected disability
compensation benefits, decisions on claims to increase the disability
rating for a condition for which the veteran is already receiving
service-connected compensation, decisions on claims to reopen
previously denied claims based on the existence of new and material
evidence, decisions on requests to revise previously denied claims
based on clear and unmistakable error, and decisions on new disability
claims where the veteran is already receiving service-connected
compensation for a different disability or disabilities.41
Equally important, the VA service-connected compensation benefit
program is just one of several claims-based monetary benefit programs
administered by VA regarding veterans’ disabilities. Other VA
programs include the pension program (which is means-tested and
provides benefits to wartime veterans who are over age sixty-five or
are totally disabled for reasons unrelated to their military service)42
and the dependency and indemnity compensation program (which
provides benefits to qualified survivors of veterans whose serviceconnected disability played a more than de minimus role in their death,
were rated as 100% service-connected disabled for the ten years
preceding death, or meet another eligibility category).43 These
programs are not as large as the service-connected disability
compensation program in terms of size and budget, but they are
substantial programs that play a vital role in providing benefits to
veterans and/or their survivors.
Finally, VA does not necessarily reach a final decision on a claim
in any of these three programs in a single step at a single level of the
agency. VA is composed of 57 regional offices44 and a centralized
Board of Veterans’ Appeals in Washington, D.C.45 The appropriate
regional office is responsible for making the initial decision on a
claim. Once the regional office makes the initial decision on a claim,
there are multiple layers of administrative appeal—with the final

41
42
43
44

45

Id.
38 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (2014).
38 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (2014).
See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Regional Benefit Office Websites,
VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://www.benefits.va.gov
/benefits/offices.asp.
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals, VA.GOV (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/.
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appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.46 Judicial review of VA
decisions is then available by appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims.47 Meanwhile, there are substantive variations in
appeal types. Some appeals challenge a decision by VA to deny a
claim. Other appeals involve claims that were granted by VA but the
claimant disagrees with a portion of VA’s decision, such as the rating
assigned to the disability or the effective date assigned to the claim. In
addition to these variables, remands from one level of appeal—
whether from the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims back
down to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals or from the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals back down to one of the 57 VA regional offices—
occur with great frequency. In this way, claims—or parts of claims—
are simultaneously climbing the appeal ladder and descending the
appeal ladder, creating different pressure points in different kinds of
ways on the VA system.48
In short, the original question—which kinds of VA claims, in what
programs, at what layer of the adjudicative process, should be factored
into defining the VA backlog—is enormously complicated.
Unsurprisingly, there is no unified approach to date. This definitional
instability has made it harder for various actors to corral the problems
within VA’s adjudicative processes and to construct remedies. It is far
beyond the scope of this essay to examine the VA backlog from every
potential angle. For present purposes, let us focus on the metric upon
which VA itself has most focused in the backlog debate: the amount of
time it takes VA’s regional offices to make an initial decision on a new
claim for service-connected disability compensation benefits. This is
the metric that animated the vignette with which this essay began—

46

47

48

Board of Veterans Appeals, How Do I Appeal?, VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3,
2014) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf.
See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL PART V (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B.
Abrams eds., 2013) (for an overview of the VA claims adjudication process);
see Section V infra (discussing in greater detail the judiciary’s role in policing
VA decisions and processes).
See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Commentary on Three Cases from the Federal
Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as We Approach TwentyFive Years of Judicial Review of Veterans’ Benefits, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 136,
150-52 (2013) (discussing the role VA remands play in fostering delay); James
D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS
L. REV. 113 (2009).
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and it is the metric that serves as the touchstone for the arguments that
follow.49
As to the second question—which for the purposes of this essay is
the much more salient question—VA has been permitted to define
what counts as a timely decision on a claim, and hence to define the
scope of its own backlog to a great extent.50 As highlighted at the
outset of this essay, VA is not subject to any externally imposed
deadline for making initial decisions on new claims for serviceconnected compensation benefits. Despite VA’s prerogative in this
context—or perhaps because of it—VA has defined timely decisionmaking in different ways at different points in time.
For the years 1998-2015—an eighteen-year span—one can find no
fewer than fourteen different timeliness goals reported by VA
regarding the number of days in which VA intended to decide serviceconnected compensation claims. For 2011, VA even set two different
annual goals for that year—a paradox revealed by a General
Accounting Office report.51 The report noted the overall goal in
number of days set by VA for that year was shorter than the sum total
of the number of days identified by VA as the goal for particular
phases within the overall claims determination process.52 In any event,
during this eighteen-year span, one can find VA timeliness goals
articulated by VA ranging from 90 days at the shortest to 250 days at
the longest, with 157.66 days as the average annual goal. From
shortest to longest, one can find the following timeliness goals
identified by VA: 90 days,53 99 days,54 100 days,55 106 days,56 125

49

50

51
52
53

To be clear, virtually all of the points raised in this essay about delays in the
service-connected disability compensation benefit program can apply equally to
the VA pension and dependency and indemnity compensation programs. For the
purposes of cabining the discussion, however, this essay focuses on the serviceconnected disability compensation benefit program.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY
BENEFITS: TIMELY PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 8, fig. 4
(2012).
Id.
Id.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP, GAO-02-645T, VETERANS’ BENEFITS:
DESPITE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL
BE CHALLENGING (2002) at 1 (noting that this was the goal in 2003);
VETERANS’ CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM’N REP. (1998) at 186 (noting that this
was the goal in 1998).
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days,57 132 days,58 145 days,59 158 days,60 160 days,61 165 days,62 168
days,63 169 days,64 185 days,65 208 days,66 230 days,67 and 250 days.68
Table 1, below, reflects these changes by year.69

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL
YEAR 1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE
PLAN 2 (2000).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP, GAO-02-645T, VETERANS’ BENEFITS:
DESPITE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL
BE CHALLENGING (2002) at 1 (noting that this was the goal in 2003).
VETERANS’ CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM’N REP. (1998) at 186 (noting that this
was the goal in 1998).
DEP’T. OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., PART II at 3 (2013) (noting that this was the long-term goal identified for
the period 2010 to 2015).
The General Accounting Office noted that even though VA’s 2011 goal was to
decide claims within 125 days, when one added up the target number of days
identified by VA for each step of the claims process, the total was 132 days.
DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
(2004) at 62, 65; DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2005) at 60; BOOZ, ALLEN, HAMILTON, VETERANS’
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION AND PENSION CLAIMS DEVELOPMENT CYCLE STUDY
(June 5, 2009) at 1. (noting that this was the goal in 2004, 2005, and 2009).
DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., PART II (2013) at 28.
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2000 and 2007. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR 1999
PERFORMANCE REP. AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN II, 2 (2000);
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., 11 (2007).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2003 and 2010. U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 45
(2003); U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 14 (2010).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2009. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8 (2009).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2008 and 2009. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 4 (2008); DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. II, 28
(2013).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2006. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8 (2006).
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This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2002. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 48 (2002).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2012. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., II, 28 (2013).
This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2013. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. II, 28 (2013).
Not only has VA regularly revised its stated goal for timely decision making, but
it has also revised its method of including or excluding certain categories of
claims from the same timeliness goals. For example, for a period of time VA
applied the same timeliness goal to original service-connected compensation
claims and original pension claims and also claims to reopen. See, e.g., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146,
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, (May 18, 2000) at p. 3. n. 2 (“In its fiscal year
2001 performance plan, VBA did not establish separate processing-time goals
for compensation and pension claims. Instead, [VA’s timeliness goal] is a
composite goal for all compensation and pension actions requiring disability
ratings. Initial compensation claims, on average, require more time to process
than initial pension claims.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS &
TESTIMONY GAO-05-749T, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: CLAIMS
PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS
MAY BE DIFFICULT, 1, n. 1 (May 26, 2005). Later, VA created separate
timeliness goals for service-connected compensation claims and pension claims.
See, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., PART II, 6-7 (2013)(setting forth separate timeliness
goals for service-connected compensation claims and pension claims). In
addition, in some instances—whether because of definitional instability or other
factors—one can sometimes locate multiple VA timeliness goals for the same
fiscal year. Compare U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Reports & Testimony THEHS/AIMD-00-146 VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND
CHALLENGES FACING DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 3(May 18, 2000)
(identifying 74 days as VA’s timeliness goal for year 2000), with U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR
1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN 2
(2000) (identifying 160 days as VA’s timeliness goal for year 2000). Moreover,
in 2009, VA shifted from assessing timeliness based on the average number of
days it took the agency to decide claims to assessing whether all claims were
decided within the target number of days. See Tom Philpott. Shinseki: Backlog
Goal Drew Fire, Also Dollars, MILITARY.COM (May 14, 2014)
http://www.military.com/benefits/2013/07/18/shinseki-backlog-goal-drew-firealso-dollars.html. In these and other ways, there is admittedly a certain applesto-oranges quality about charting the evolution of VA’s timeliness goals over
the years. That said, it seems more than justified to point to VA’s own timeliness
goals for the purposes of this essay’s thesis. No matter how defined by VA over
the years, VA has consistently applied the timeliness goals cited here to new
claims for service-connected compensation benefits, which is the primary focus
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Table 1: VA’s Goals in Number of Days to Make Decisions on
Claims, 1998-2015

300

250

250
230
208

Number of Days

200
185
169

165
150

169

160
145

165

145
132
125

106

100

100

99

74

50

0
'98

'99

'00

'01

'02

'03

'04

'05

'06

'07

'08

'09

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

Year

Of course, VA’s fluctuating timeliness goals only tell part of the
story. VA’s timeliness goals must be considered against the backdrop
of how long it actually took VA in a given year to decide the claims
pending at the agency. Thus, Table 2 charts VA’s timeliness goals
against the actual number of days on average it took VA to decide
claims in a given year.

of this essay. And whether the timeliness goals have been described as the target
average number of days for claims to be decided or as a deadline to decide all
claims, by establishing such goals in the first place VA has acknowledged the
general applicability and utility of these goals.
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Table 2: VA’s Goals in Number of Days to Make Decisions on
Claims Charted Against Actual Number of Days on Average to
Decide Claims, 1998-2015 70
400

350

300

Number of Days

250
250

230

200

208

Average Number of Days
for VA to Decide Claims
185
169

165

150

169

165

160
145

VA's Goal for Number of
Days to Decide Claims

145
132
125

100
106
100

99

74

50

0
'98

'99

'00

'01

'02

'03

'04

'05

'06

'07

'08

'09

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

Year

70

The cite for 205 average number of days to decide claims in 1999 is U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 3(May 18, 2000) . Another source identified
166 days as the figure U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR 1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL
YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN 2 (2000). The first report was dated May 18,
2000; the second was dated June 30, 2000. The 205 figure has been used in this
chart. For the actual number of days on average to decide claims for 1998, see S.
Gen. Accounting Office Reports & Testimony T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 4, fig. 2 (May 18, 2000); for 1999, see id.; for
2000, see DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2002 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 48 (2002); for 2001, see id.; for 2002, see id.; for 2003,
see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 7, 45 (2003); for 2004, see DEP’T OF VETERANS’

70

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 50

Table 2 confirms that VA has engaged in a constant game of catch
up throughout this timeframe. In sum, VA set goals that shifted nearly
every year and that, even then, it rarely met. Only twice—in 2006 and
2009—did VA meet its timeliness goals. Given that the agency’s
timeliness goals changed from year to year, it is not precisely clear
what can even be made of this putative achievement. The timeliness
goals for those two years—185 days and 169 days respectively—were
both above the average timeliness goal (157.66 days) for the period
1998-2015, not to mention substantially above the long-term
timeliness goals (74 days and 90 days) that have been cited by VA at
various points during this same period. Moreover, because VA set its
timeliness goals before each year began, it repeatedly adjusted those
goals from year to year based on the realities of the agency’s everchanging actual and anticipated burdens.71 Overall, aggregating the
data for the period 1998-2013, and even with its continually shifting
timeliness goals, VA still missed its goals by an average of 30.62
days.72

AFFAIRS, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 2, 6, 8, 13, 60, 62,
84, 139, 144, 156, 157 (2004); for 2005, see DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS,
2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 6 (2005); for 2006, see DEP’T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8
(2006); for 2007, see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2007 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 11 (2007); for 2008, see DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 4 (2008); for 2009,
see DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., 8 (2009); for 2010, see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2010
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 14 (2010); for 2011, see U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: TIMELY
PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 7, fig. 3 (2012); for 2012, see
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
II, 6, 28 (2013); for 2013, see id.
71

72

For example, the General Accounting Office noted in 2002 that VA’s Strategic
Plan for the period 2001-2006 set forth 74 days as VA’s goal for the number of
days to decide claims by 2006. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS &
TESTIMONY, GAO-02-645T VETERANS’ BENEFITS: DESPITE RECENT
IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL BE CHALLENGING,
5, n. 6(April 26, 2002) . Once 2006 arrived, however, VA revised its timeliness
goal for that year to 185 days, more than double the original goal. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 8 (2006).
The years 2014 and 2015 have been excluded from this calculation because only
VA’s timeliness goal for those years—and not its actual average number of days
to decide claims—is known at present.
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In 2009, then VA Secretary Eric Shinseki decided that VA needed
to shed this habit of ever-changing timeliness goals.73 VA therefore
adopted 125 days as the agency’s goal for deciding claims. This 125day goal became the demarcation point of the backlog. Claims that
were pending more than 125 days were part of the backlog. Claims
that were pending for fewer than 125 days were not part of the
backlog. In 2013, VA reaffirmed its goal—which it states it intends to
reach by 2015—to make decisions on all service-connected
compensation claims within 125 days.74 That said, in 2013 VA also
identified 90 days as a “strategic target” for making decisions on
claims.75 It is not clear when VA intends to apply or meet the 90-day
“strategic target.” Notably, VA also identified 90-days as the “strategic
target” in 2003, more than a decade ago.76
B. Remedying the Backlog
Amid all of the fluctuations in VA’s goals for timely claims
processing, and the worsening of the backlog crisis in recent years, VA
actually began to make meaningful progress in reducing the backlog in
2013. The number of claims that have been pending for more than 125
days without a decision fell significantly, from 611,073 claims in
March of 2013 to 300,620 claims in May of 2014.77 VA’s success in
reducing the claims backlog may have come with a price, however.
Concerns have been raised that VA has sacrificed accuracy for speed,

73

74

75
76

77

See Tom Philpott, Shinseki: Backlog Goal Drew Fire, Also Dollars,
MILITARY.COM, (May 14, 2014) http://www.military.com/benefits/2013/07/18
/shinseki-backlog-goal-drew-fire-also-dollars.html.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.,
PART II, 3, 28 (2013).
Id.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.,
45 (2003).
See Veterans Benefits Administration Reports, Claims Backlog, VA.GOV(last
visited May 16, 2014) available at http://benefits.va.gov/reports/mmwr_va
_claims_backlog.asp; Josh Hicks, Veterans Affairs’ Backlog of Claims Down
44% Since Peaking a Year Ago, Department Says, WASH. POST (May 16, 2014)
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government
/veterans-affairs-claims-backlog-down-44-percent-since-peaking-one-yearago/2014/04/01/c4e496ae-b9d6-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html .
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and that, by redeploying agency resources to battle the claims backlog,
VA has permitted its administrative appeals backlog to grow.78
VA reports that it has used a number of strategies in its effort to
combat the backlog. Among these are the decrease in paper claims
filed and increased use of technology; streamlined processes; enhanced
employee trainings; mandatory overtime; and prioritization of the
oldest claims.79 Many additional steps have been proposed. To cite just
a few: extending VA’s Fully Developed Claims Process;80 improving
the extent to which the Department of Defense and other federal
agencies are responsive to VA records requests;81 and increasing
transparency about VA’s internal processes and progress in meeting its
goals. 82
Even with VA’s recent progress in reducing the backlog, the future
is quite uncertain. The number of new service-connected disability
compensation claims filed by veterans of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan is predicted to increase in the coming years, not

78

79

80

81
82

In any event, given the recent scandal at VA about record keeping related to the
timely scheduling of medical appointments, there may be good cause to be
circumspect about progress related to the disability claims backlog. See e.g.,
Katie Zezima, Everything you need to know about the VA- and the scandals
engulfing it, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2014) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/21/a-guide-to-the-vaand-the-scandals-engulfing-it/; Teresa Welsh, Views You Can Use: Veterans
Health Care Backlog Sparks a Scandal, USNEWS, (May 20, 2014) available at
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/05/20/veterans-affairs-healthcare-backlog-causes-a-scandal-commentators-react; The Editorial Board. VA
backlog fails ailing veterans: Our view, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013) available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21/va-veterans-disabilityclaims-backlog-editorials-debates/2683167/.
See DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO ELIMINATE
THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS BACKLOG (2013) 5-10; Disability Claims Backlog
Reduced by 44 Percent since Peaking One Year Ago Lowest level since Agent
Orange cases added in 2011, VA.GOV (Apr. 1, 2014) http://www.va.gov/opa
/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2532.
THE VA CLAIMS BACKLOG WORKING GROUP REPORT 21 (Mar. 2014) . The
Fully Developed Claims Process “rewards” a veteran with a year’s worth of
additional benefits when the veteran files a claim that VA can grant within 90
days because the veteran has already developed and included all of the evidence
necessary to decide the claim. Id. In this way, the Fully Developed Claim
program is intended to relieve VA of the resource-intense burden of gathering
evidence. The program is not without controversy.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 28-29.
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decrease.83 Advances in science—including a deeper understanding of
the health hazards posed by burn pits and other environmental
exposures in Iraq and Afghanistan84 and improvements in the
diagnosis of traumatic brain injury85—may increase the number and
complexity of claims made to VA. Unforeseen changes in veterans’
benefits law may also lead to unexpected surges in claims and appeals.
Finally, just as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—and the toll they
would take on the nation’s servicemen and servicewomen—could not
have been predicted, the timing and toll of the next conflict cannot be
predicted either.
In addition to all of these contingencies, VA’s commitment to the
125-day timeline for deciding claims remains tenuous as well. The
commitment is merely a matter of policy.86 The 125-day timeline is
not enshrined in statute or regulation. Indeed, it is not a deadline at
all—it is only a policy goal. Another VA secretary under another
administration could easily revisit the wisdom of the 125-day timeline.
At the very least, even if another VA secretary did not formally
abandon the 125-day timeline, it would be simple enough to soften the
agency’s policy commitment in light of any number of factors.
Against this backdrop of uncertainty and as debate continues to
swirl about what must be done to tame the backlog once and for all, it
is therefore appropriate to consider what additional tools might be
available in this effort. Given that, at its heart, the backlog is a problem
about time—about ensuring that veterans receive without delay the
benefits they have earned—it is only sensible also to think of the
backlog as raising important conceptual and practical questions about
the relationship between administrative agencies and time deadlines.
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JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR:
THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 76-79 (2008).
See Ken Bastida, Veterans Returning Home From Iraq, Afghanistan Point To
Open Air Burn Pits As New ‘Agent Orange’, CBS SAN FRANCISCO (May 20,
2014) available at http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/05/20/veteransreturning-home-from-foreign-wars-falling-ill-dying-from-new-agent-orangeiraq-afghanistan-war-soldier-soldiers-chemical-cancer-garbage-incineratorservice-va/; see also U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA’s Action Plan:
Burn Pits and Airborne Hazards, VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available
at http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/burnpits/action-plan.asp.
See generally TBI in the News, BRAIN TRAUMA FOUNDATION (last visited Dec.
3, 2014) available at https://www.braintrauma.org/tbi-faqs/tbi-in-the-news/
(noting advancements in traumatic brain injury research and diagnosis).
See Philpott, supra note 73.
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To date, VA has never been subject to an externally imposed deadline
for deciding service-connected disability compensation claims.87 As
set forth in the sections to follow, that is a step worth taking.88
IV. EXTERNAL VS. INTERNAL DEADLINES
Unsurprisingly, psychologists have found that individuals are more
likely to comply with time deadlines when the deadlines are externally
imposed, as compared to deadlines that are internally imposed, or selfgenerated. In a 2002 study, psychologists measured the potential value
of externally-imposed coursework deadlines compared to internallyimposed deadlines among a population of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology students. The study showed that the externally imposed
deadlines were more effective in inducing the study participants to
complete the work in question.89 This same dynamic also appears to
apply with respect to agencies.90 In sum, the odds seem strong that if
87
88

89

90

Id.
It is worth pausing here before proceeding to underscore that delays at VA
cannot—and must not—be understood in purely abstract terms or solely through
the lens of administrative law and policy. The real-world harms occasioned by
delay are felt everyday by individual veterans. These harms include, but are not
limited to, deprivation of earned compensation, frustration and anxiety, and
encountering barriers to other benefits—such as VA healthcare—the eligibility
for which is often linked to antecedent eligibility for service-connected disability
compensation benefits.
Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and
Performance: Self-Control and Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 3
(2002). See also Dan Ariely and Dan Zakay, A timely account of the role of
duration in decision making, 108 (2) ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 187, 199 (2001)
(discussing how decision makers alter their perspective based on their temporal
orientation to the decision in question and noting that “[r]esearch indeed
demonstrates that deadlines have a strong influence on behavior”); but see
Alberto Bisin and Kyle Hyndman, Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines
in a Field Experiment, NBER Working Paper No. 19874 (January 2014)
(questioning specific conclusions drawn by Ariely and Wertenbroch about ways
in which deadlines affect behavior). Most of the research cited here studies
deadlines within the context of concerns about persons who may or may not
tend to procrastinate. My point is not that there is a VA backlog because VA
employees procrastinate; rather, it is that studies of the use of deadlines in other
contexts can be helpful to thinking about how individual humans assess
deadlines within the context of a large and complex system subject to time and
resource constraints.
Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PENN. LAW REV. 923 (2008) (using empirical study to find that imposing
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Congress were to impose a deadline upon VA for deciding serviceconnected disability compensation claims, on balance VA’s
compliance rate with that deadline would be greater than its
compliance rate with a purely internal but otherwise identical
deadline.91
To date, the idea of imposing such a deadline upon VA has
received scant attention.92 At first blush, this omission may seem
strange. Congress creates statutory deadlines in all kinds of
administrative contexts;93 it would seemingly be simple enough to
create such a deadline for decisions on claims for service-connected
disability compensation. Although it is impossible to know with
certainty, Congress may not have been well positioned to consider this
option because of the conceptual frameworks most often used in
discussions of VA programs. Specifically, VA’s service-connected
disability compensation program is frequently analogized to the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) disability programs.94 There are
many similarities indeed.

91

92

93

94

external deadlines upon agencies tends to increase the pace of the agency action
in question); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a PrincipalAgent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency
Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 (discussing enforcement tools to
police and remedy agency delay); Note, Improving Statutory Deadlines on
Agency Action: Learning from the SEC’s Missed Deadlines Under the JOBS
Act, 92 TEX. L. REV. 995 (2014) (arguing that, depending on circumstances,
statutory deadlines for agency action can help ensure agency acts timely where
agency would not otherwise do so).
Of course, efficiency is not—and should not be—the only consideration.
Questions of accuracy are taken up in Section VI. See infra Section VI.
See supra note 19; Riley, supra note 38 (briefly referencing the value of
imposing a statutory processing deadline upon VA that would require VA to
grant the claim if not decided by the deadline).
Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PENN. LAW REV. 923, 925 (2008) (“Deadlines requiring agencies to
commence or complete action by a specific date are common in the modern
administrative state.”).
For examples of scholarship that invoke the VA/SSA comparison in one form or
another, see e.g., James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 48, at
162-65; Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process,
90 NEB. L. REV. 388, 431-33 (2011). For an example of a judicial decision that
does so, see Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1204
(2011). For a broader discussion of the role agency and program analogies play
in discussions of potential VA reforms, see Rory E. Riley, The Importance of
Preserving the Pro-Claimant Policy Underlying the Veterans’ Benefits Scheme:
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Both programs require the collection and analysis of enormous
quantities of medical and other data. Both programs require a
determination of disability. Both programs must make use of
administrative systems to receive, process, and decide an extraordinary
number of claims. Both programs are large and expensive. Both
programs employ multiple levels of administrative appeal. Both
programs interact directly with claimants, many of whom have serious
health issues and/or financial distress. One could go on. Of course,
there are also important differences. Whereas VA must determine
whether a disability is or is not service-connected and must assign a
percentage rating to each disability, SSA is not concerned with
determining the origin of disability, nor is SSA concerned with the
percentage gradations in disability so critical to the VA process.
Moreover, VA’s duty to assist claimants throughout the administrative
process is much greater than SSA’s duty. These are just a few of the
many differences.
In any event, because SSA has served as such a powerful
touchstone for discussions about VA’s woes, it is perhaps
understandable that Congress has not meaningfully considered the
potential utility of imposing a deadline on VA for deciding serviceconnected disability compensation claims. For, SSA is not subject to
any statutory deadlines for making decisions on disability claims. VA,
as SSA’s putative closest cousin among federal benefit programs,
logically would be a poor fit for a statutorily-imposed deadline too.
Rarely, if ever, heard in discussions of VA are analogies to other
benefit programs, including programs subject to formal—whether
statutory or regulatory— deadlines for making decisions on
applications. To return to one of the programs discussed in the vignette
at the outset of the essay, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP)—also sometimes still known by its former name, the
Food Stamp program—is one such example.95 Pursuant to 7 CFR

95

A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Structure of the Department of
Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits System, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 77 (2010).
At first glance, SNAP may seem like an improbable comparison to the serviceconnected disability compensation program. SNAP is a means-tested program
for the general population that continues to be marked by the stigma of welfare.
The service-connected disability compensation program reflects compensation
that has been earned by veterans through the service and sacrifice in the armed
forces. There are also important differences in basic structure. SNAP, though
funded by the federal government, is administered by state and local government
entities. The service-connected disability compensation program is a pure
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§ 273.2(g), SNAP applications must be decided within thirty days.96
We might call this an externally imposed deadline because SNAP is a
program of cooperative federalism: the federal government provides
funding and establishes the legal framework for the program’s
operations, but state agencies administer SNAP at the local level and
are subject to this legal framework, including the thirty-day deadline
for deciding applications set forth in federal regulations.
Not only is the thirty-day deadline for SNAP externally imposed, it
is enforceable through at least four different mechanisms. First, SNAP
is enforceable through administrative oversight. The Food and
Nutrition Service, a unit within the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
audits state agencies in order to monitor and enforce compliance with
federal regulations, including the thirty-day deadline for deciding new
applications.97 Second, enforcement occurs via political oversight.

96

97

federal program. Finally, determining eligibility for SNAP is a far simpler task
compared to determining eligibility for service-connected disability
compensation benefits. For these reasons and others, Social Security—not
SNAP—has been the preferred comparison for VA. But, as discussed in greater
detail below, SNAP may have a lot to teach VA about the utility of deadlines
and conceptions of procedural justice. For a discussion of the veterans’ benefits
system as inheriting potentially contradictory attributes from two different
public benefit traditions, see Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and
Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 303 (2004). Moreover, many low-income servicemembers and veterans
are eligible for and receive SNAP benefits. Alan Pike, “Military Families’
Reliance on Food Stamps Hit a Record High Last Year,” THINKPROGRESS.ORG
(Feb. 18, 2014) http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/02/18/3299971/foodstamps-military/.
In some limited circumstances, SNAP applications must be decided more
quickly (seven days). 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i) (2012). In other scenarios, applications
may be decided more slowly (sixty days) based on the fault of the applicant or
the agency.
Tyler Dukes, Progress continues toward cutting food stamps backlog
WRAL.com (Feb. 4, 2014) http://www.wral.com/progress-continues-towardcutting-food-stamp-backlog/13355718/#S9jYC9eoL3U3kDzV.99 (stating that
“Under the gun of a federal ultimatum, state and county health officials cut a
longstanding backlog of food stamps cases nearly in half over the weekend”);
Feds say NC has cleared food stamp backlog, NEWSOBSERVER.COM, (April 15,
2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/04/15/3787197/feds-say-nc-hascleared-food-stamp.html (“The state has adequately cleared a long backlog that
was delaying food aid to North Carolinians, the federal government announced
Tuesday”); Andy Miller, Georgia officials say food stamp backlog over ONLINE
ATHENS, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, (June 5, 2014)
http://onlineathens.com/local-news/2014-06-04/georgia-officials-say-food-
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Congress monitors the work of the Food and Nutrition Service,
including the extent to which the Food and Nutrition Service is
fulfilling its obligation to ensure compliance with federal standards at
the state and local level.98 Third, there is enforcement at the individual
level. An individual applicant for SNAP can pursue an administrative
appeal.99 And fourth, there is judicial enforcement at the group level.
Where there are systemic failures by a state or local agency in
complying with the thirty-day deadline for deciding SNAP
applications, class action litigation can be pursued to enforce the
agency’s legal duty to decide applications by the deadline set forth in
the regulation.100 The potential availability of attorneys’ fees in these
suits helps ensure that private attorneys generally take on large and
costly litigation of this kind.101
These four different enforcement tools—administrative oversight,
political oversight, individual administrative appeals, and group-level
judicial enforcement—have, at least on balance, proven effective in
policing basic compliance with the thirty-day SNAP processing
deadline in the aggregate across the fifty states. Maintaining a SNAP
backlog is, simply put, unlawful under 7 CFR 273.2(g). By contrast,

98

99
100

101

stamp-backlog-over (“After clearing a backlog of thousands seeking food
stamps, Georgia officials now are waiting to find out if it might lose millions in
federal funding.”)
See History of FNS, USDA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://
www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/HISTORY%20OF%20FNS.pdf.
7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2014).
See, e.g., Briggs v. Bremby 3:12cv324(VLB), 2012 WL 6026167, (D. Conn
Dec. 4, 2102) (issuing preliminary injunction requiring state agency to comply
with federal application processing deadlines); Booth v. McManaman, 830
F.Supp.2d 1037 (D. Haw.Nov. 16, 2011) (issuing preliminary injunction
requiring state agency to comply with federal application processing deadlines.
For an excellent discussion of using litigation as a tool to enforce the federal
timeliness requirements for SNAP, see Marc Cohan & Mary R. Mannix,
National Center for Law and Economic Justice SNAP Application Delay
Litigation Project, CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW: JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND
POLICY 208-17 (Sept.-Oct. 2012). Many of the lessons learned described by
Cohan and Mannix from the SNAP context can potentially apply to advocacy
strategies for the VA context.
See Bracantelli v. Burns, CIV 04-421 TUC CKJ (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2005)
(reflecting that settlement agreement in Food Stamp delay case contains attorney
fee provision for plaintiffs).
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while the backlog at VA has been called “outrageous,”102
“unconscionable,”103 “a national disgrace,”104 and other similar
epithets, politicians, advocates, and members of the media have never
called the VA backlog unlawful—because at present it is not. This
basic fact produces second order challenges as well. Because VA’s
deadline for deciding service-connected disability compensation
claims is merely an internally generated policy goal, and because of
some of the idiosyncrasies of veterans benefits law, the enforcement
mechanisms currently available to police delays at VA have, like VA’s
own timeliness goals, proven far too weak for the job. It is to these
challenges that this essay next turns.
V. ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
Compared to the tools available to police compliance with the
thirty-day decision-making requirements imposed by federal
regulations for SNAP, the enforcement tools to police VA’s policy
goal for timely decision making are, not unexpectedly, far more
limited. Congress does of course have oversight of VA, including
oversight of VA’s paradigm for defining and meeting timely decisionmaking goals. As the discussion in Section IV illustrated, for more
than a decade this oversight has not produced much consistency or
clarity with respect to VA’s timeliness goals. Nor has congressional
oversight produced much meaningful progress—at least until the very

102

103

104

Brendan Mosley, Roby and Rogers Critical of VA Backlog, ALABAMA
POLITICAL REPORTER (May 6, 2014), http://www.alreporter.com/in-case-youmissed-it-2/6220-roby-and-rogers-critical-of-va-backlog.html
(quoting
Congresswoman Martha Roby as stating the VA claims backlog is
“outrageous”).
Leo Shane III, , Skeptics doubt VA’s claim of breakthrough on claims backlog,
STARS & STRIPES (June 19, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/news/skeptics-doubtva-s-claim-of-breakthrough-on-claims-backlog-1.180811 (quoting Rep. Gus
Bilirakis, R-Fla, as stating the VA claims backlog is “unconscionable”).
Seth McLaughlin, Sen. Mitch McConnell: VA disability claim backlog is
‘national disgrace’, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 22, 2013 http://www
.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2013/jul/22/sen-mitch-mcconnell-vadisability-claim-backlog-na/ (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell as declaring the
VA claims backlog a “national disgrace”); USA Today Editorial Board, VA
backlog fails ailing veterans: Our view, USA TODAY, August 21, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21/va-veterans-disabilityclaims-backlog-editorials-debates/2683167/ (describing the VA claims backlog
as “a national disgrace”).
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recent and still disputed progress—in reducing the claims backlog. So
entrenched are VA’s woes that many are now declaring VA’s failures
also Congress’s failures.105
It should come as little surprise that other actors in the veterans
benefit system—namely, veterans and their advocates—have sought to
fill the void. These actors have attempted to compel VA to make
timely decisions on disability claims by means outside the realms of
political and policy advocacy before Congress and VA. Whether at the
individual or group level, they have found little success—for reasons
mostly peculiar to veterans’ benefits law.
Because VA has no legal duty to decide claims within any
particular length of time, individual veterans often find themselves in a
kind of black hole when they try to pursue administrative appeals and
seek judicial remedies for VA’s failure to make timely decisions.
For starters, the failure by a regional office to issue an initial
decision—unlike the failure of a SNAP agency to issue an initial
decision within thirty days—is not understood to give rise to a
meritorious administrative appeal.106 In essence, no matter how long a
regional office might take to make an initial decision on a claim, there
are apparently no grounds to pursue an administrative appeal for that
delay. Nor can a direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (CAVC) necessarily be had in such circumstances.
The Court’s jurisdiction on direct appeal is limited to reviewing final
decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA).107 As a practical
consequence, on direct appeal the CAVC can only review decisions by
105

106

107

See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Real Problem with VA? Congress.,
WASHINGTON POST, May 29, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/congress-owns-a-part-of-the-vas-failures/2014/05/29/ab94248e-e5b0-11e38f90-73e071f3d637_story.html (stating that “Congress has held scores of
oversight hearings about the VA but has failed to produce adequate VA
performance” and that “Congressional self-scrutiny must also be a big part of
any meaningful solution.”); Jordain Carney and Stacy Kaper, Who Really Broke
Veterans Affairs?, NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 21, 2014, http://www
.nationaljournal.com/defense/who-really-broke-veterans-affairs-20140520
(stating that Congress “cannot claim clean hands” with respect to problems at
VA, including the claims backlog, and that Congress’s “record of efficacy is
mixed at best—especially in terms of eliminating the claims backlog.”).
See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a); (b)(1) (2014) (stating that appellate review is initiated
by filing a “Notice of Disagreement” and that right to file Notice of
Disagreement is triggered by the “mailing of notice of the result of initial review
or determination”).
38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a); 7266(a) (2014).
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the BVA to grant or deny a claim—not a regional office’s failure to
render an initial decision or the BVA’s failure to recognize a veteran’s
claimed right to appeal administratively the delay at a regional
office.108 Apart from substantive barriers, the administrative appeal
process itself is both exceedingly slow and complex. Furthermore,
once on judicial review before the CAVC, the proceedings become
both more complex and formally adversarial. Overall, trying to
construct and pursue an administrative appeal and then direct appeal to
the CAVC to challenge a delay at a regional office is a daunting, and
perhaps hopeless, task.
At present, the only other viable mechanism for an individual
veteran109 to remedy delays in deciding his or her claim is to file an
original petition for extraordinary relief at the CAVC pursuant to the
All Writs Act.110 The CAVC possesses jurisdiction under the All Writs
Act to compel VA to decide claims “within a reasonable period of
time.”111 However, the elements necessary to prove entitlement to a
writ are onerous: the right to the writ must be “clear and indisputable”;
no alternative avenue can exist to obtain the relief sought; and the
CAVC must be satisfied that, in the exercise of its discretion, issuance
of a writ is appropriate.112 Moreover, the CAVC has interpreted
“reasonable period of time” at a high level of generality and in a
manner reflecting significant deference to VA. According to the
CAVC, “[w]hile there is no absolute definition of what is reasonable

108

109

110

111
112

Maggit v. West, 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000); DeCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.
App. 52 (2006).
This essay uses the term “veteran” to encompass not just those meet the
statutory definition within the veterans benefit system, but also survivors who
are sometimes entitled to step into the shoes of a deceased veteran to pursue the
veteran’s claim still pending for service-connected disability compensation
benefits. This process is known as a claim for accrued benefits. Too often
interminable delays in the adjudication of claims makes it more likely that a
veteran will pass away before the claim is fully and finally decided.
26 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2014). Of course, there are also numerous informal
mechanisms theoretically available to veterans—such as seeking the
intervention of an elected official, repeated calls, correspondence, and visits to
the Regional Office or the BVA, community organizing and protest, and the
like. Such efforts are sometimes productive. Then again, veterans should not
have to go to such lengths merely to receive a timely—and accurate—decision
from VA in their cases.
See Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3 (1990).
Id. at 9-10.
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time, we know that it may encompass ‘months, occasionally a year or
two, but not several years or a decade.’” 113
To illustrate the difficulties inherent in this framework, consider
the following case decided by the CAVC. A veteran filed an original
claim for service-connected disability compensation in 1998.114 That
claim was still pending and unadjudicated nine years later—in 2007.115
In that year, the veteran filed a petition for extraordinary relief at the
CAVC under the All Writs Act.116 At the CAVC, the VA indicated
that it was now taking steps to move adjudication of the veteran’s
initial claim forward.117 Importantly, the CAVC noted that in cases
under the All Writs Act involving alleged delays in adjudicating
claims, the CAVC must consider the existing demands placed on, and
the resources available, to VA.118 Given all of these considerations,
and the elements necessary to establish entitlement to a writ, the
CAVC found the lengthy delay in the case insufficient to justify
issuance of a writ.119 As the CAVC put it, “because [the veteran] has
failed to demonstrate that any alleged delay in adjudicating his claim is
so extraordinary that it is equivalent to an arbitrary refusal by the
Secretary to act, he has not shown a clear and indisputable right to a
writ, and the Court will deny the petition.”120
In many circumstances, the filing of a petition for extraordinary
relief can spark VA to act on the underlying claim, even if it does not
lead to a decision by the CAVC to issue a writ.121 But that hardly
addresses several underlying barriers to the use of the All Writs Act as
a tool to remedy delays in individual cases. First, many veterans will
be ill-equipped to file a pleading in federal court in the first instance,
let alone to engage in ongoing litigation there against counsel for VA
as part of an adversarial process. Second, securing representation in
113
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115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Chandler v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 175, 177 (1997) (quoting Erspramer, 1 Vet.
App. at 10). These cases involved delays in adjudicating remanded claims at the
agency level.
See James v. Nicholson, No. 07-1750 2007 WL 2938179 (Vet. App. Sept. 21,
2007).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. The James case is one such example.
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such cases can prove difficult,122 and the availability of pro bono
assistance is necessarily limited. And third, with or without
representation, time-consuming and repeated—albeit unsuccessful—
efforts must typically be made to urge VA to act before one can file a
well-pled petition for extraordinary relief with the CAVC.123 In sum,
the number of veterans who actually file petitions under the All Writs
Act pales in comparison to the number of veterans who are harmed by
delays at VA.124 While the All Writs Act can provide an important
mechanism for an individual veteran to seek a remedy for agency
delays in his or her individual case, for the overall population of
veterans harmed by delays at VA, the All Writs Act has proven a
limited tool at best.
Against this backdrop, veterans have also sought legal relief at the
group level using alternative vehicles.125 But these efforts—though
creative and bold—have, at least to date, unfortunately proven even
less successful than individual petitions filed in the CAVC under the
All Writs Act.
In Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, two veterans’ advocacy
organizations filed a class action lawsuit against VA seeking to
remedy systemic defects in VA’s healthcare and service-connected
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When a petition for extraordinary relief sparks VA to act, the case will generally
become moot, the CAVC will either dismiss or deny the petition, and the
veteran will be ineligible to recover fees and costs from VA under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. See Chandler v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 175, 177 (1997)
(discussing mootness under the All Writs Act); see also Buckhannon v. West
Virginia Dep’t Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting
catalyst theory for attorneys’ fees).
See.e.g., Caprice v. Shinseki, No. 12-1376 2012 WL 2339811 (Vet. App. Jan.
25, 2013).
Consider that for the entirety of Fiscal Year 2013, only 193 petitions for writs
were filed at the CAVC, of which 46% were filed pro se. ANNUAL REPORT, U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS (2013). And not all of these
petitions sought remedies for VA delays; some raised other issues. Altogether,
when weighing the 100-plus petitions filed in the CAVC in FY 2013 against the
502,942 claims for benefits VA identified as backlogged at the end of Fiscal
Year 2013, one can appreciate how few veterans are able to make use of the writ
remedy for VA delay. VA MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT, (June 24,
2013). Available at http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/historical/2013
/index.asp.
There is no class action mechanism available at the CAVC. See Lefkowitz v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991).
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disability compensation programs.126 The case was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.127 Among the
many systemic defects cited in the complaint, the plaintiffs sought a
remedy—declaratory and injunctive relief—for the widespread delays
at VA in adjudicating claims for service-connected disability
compensation.128 The plaintiffs’ causes of action were grounded in the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause and focused
on delays at the administrative appeal stage.129 After losing on this
issue in the District Court, the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a
reversal from a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.130 The
panel, with one judge dissenting, found that the systemic delays in
VA’s adjudication of service-connected disability compensation
claims did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act, but they did
violate the Due Process Clause.131 The panel remanded the case to the
District Court for further evidentiary hearings to determine the
appropriate remedies.132
That victory was short lived, however. In an en banc decision, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the panel decision, finding that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudicate the claims
regarding systemic delays.133 According to the en banc decision, the
only court with jurisdiction to hear challenges to VA’s provision of
benefits is the CAVC. That conclusion echoed the decision by the
Sixth Circuit in an earlier class action lawsuit that also had sought
relief from systemic delays in VA’s adjudication of service-connected
disability claims.134 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit had found
that only the CAVC possesses jurisdiction over such questions.135 Of
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Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 845.
See Complaint at 278, Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845,
849 (9th Cir. 2011) (No.C 07 3758 SC), 2007 WL 4718845.
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, at 851-852.
Id. at 850.
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1015.
Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id. The D.C. Circuit has done likewise. Vietnam Veterans of America v.
Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing lack of jurisdiction to dismiss
lawsuit that challenged VA delays in adjudicating claims and requested
injunction to require VA to decide claims within ninety days).
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course, as we have seen, the CAVC has very narrowly interpreted its
power to address delay at VA. And even then, individual veterans face
enormous barriers to bring such a claim to the CAVC.
In the end, veterans have found that—at least to date—the
courthouse doors have either been partially or completely shut to them
when they seek to challenge delays at VA.136 Whether at the individual
or the group level, remedies for VA delay have simply not been
forthcoming.137 The absence of meaningful administrative and judicial
enforcement both reflects and reinforces the lack of effective political
oversight.
VI. WHY A STATUTORY DEADLINE FOR DECIDING DISABILITY
CLAIMS?
In response to this state of affairs—deeply troubling delays, yearto-year fluctuations in the agency’s timeliness goals, ineffective
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That said, it would be overly simplistic to conclude that, in general, systemic
reform litigation against VA is hopeless because of the jurisdictional and
jurisprudential barriers. See, e.g., Cooper-Harris v. United States, 965 F. Supp.
2d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (striking down as unconstitutional VA’s ban on
spousal benefits to same-sex couples). Indeed, in Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did have jurisdiction,
because the plaintiffs were organizational parties and because of the manner in
which some of their claims were framed, to entertain the plaintiffs’ challenge to
“adjudication procedures in VA regional offices.” 687 F.3d at 1016. Even then,
however, the Court rejected those claims on the merits. Id.
For a nuanced discussion of the challenges of shaping judicial remedies for
delays in the adjudication of claims within federal benefit programs, see James
D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of
Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal
Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012). Professor Ridgway’s article includes a
detailed examination of the Veterans for Common Sense litigation and its
potential impact upon delays at VA. Id. at 68-73, 114-119. Note, however, that
the article was published before the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc decision
finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and reversing the panel
decision favorable to the plaintiff veterans’ organizations. For another article
published prior to the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Veterans for Common
Sense, this one arguing that the federal courts—if given an opportunity—should
issue an injunction to remedy delays in the adjudication of VA disability claims,
see Serota & Michelle Singer, supra note 94, 388. For the argument that
agencies, including the VA, should incorporate aggregate litigation models into
their administrative appeal systems in order to combat widespread delays and
common legal questions, see Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S.
Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1992 (2012).
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oversight, and limited enforcement mechanisms—there are compelling
reasons for Congress to create a statutory deadline (presumably
somewhere between 90 and 125 days) for VA to decide initial claims
for service-connected compensation benefits.138
The imposition of a statutory deadline upon VA would promote
important procedural values that would benefit veterans. Numerous
studies have documented that the experience persons have with a
process is vitally important to their overall assessment of a system of
adjudication—sometimes as important as, or even more important
than, the substantive outcome of that process.139 As one of the leading
authorities on the social psychology of the law has put it:
The procedural justice literature has shown that people’s concerns
about procedural values exist independently of whether they win or
lose, that people look for more than winning in their interactions
with the legal system, and that they evaluate the fairness of legal
140
processes according to a large variety of criteria.

Put another way:
What law has summarized under the ‘due process’ rubric, social
scientists capture as a bundle of interests, needs, or wants
described in a variety of ways—vindication, attention,
accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect,
recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, justice. . .. Research
on litigants . . . reveals a group of individuals who seek something
141
in addition to money.
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See generally supra, note 69. It is beyond the scope of this short essay to parse
out what specific number of days is the “correct” number for the purposes of
setting a deadline for VA. The range of 90-125 days has been identified here
because that is what VA has, at one time or another, identified as the appropriate
number of days.
Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More
Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV.
55, 72-75 (2013).
Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 473, 482 (2010);
see also Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128
(1988) (concluding that perceptions of fairness are weighed more heavily than
outcomes in participants’ views of the legal system).
Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296,
363-64 (1996).

2014

Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog

87

In light of these lessons from social science, imposing upon VA a
clearly-established deadline for deciding claims can improve veterans’
assessment of VA’s procedural fairness because it can serve as a
counterweight to the unidirectional way in which VA deadlines
currently operate. At present, only veterans—not VA—are subject to
deadlines within the disability adjudication system. To cite a few
examples, veterans must file notices of disagreement within one year,
substantive appeals to the BVA within ninety days, responses to BVAobtained medical opinions within sixty days,142 and appeals to the
CAVC within 120 days. By contrast, VA is not subject to any
deadlines in the adjudication of disability claims. There is no deadline
to decide a claim, to issue a statement of the case in response to a
notice of disagreement, or to decide an appeal at the BVA. According
to data from fiscal year 2012, VA took on average 2,057 days to
complete these steps.143
In this kind of legal environment—where all of the deadlines fall
on the shoulders of the participant rather than on an administrative
agency beset by intractable delays—it is little wonder that veterans
have so little faith in the system. Imposing upon VA a statutory
deadline for deciding claims can serve a valuable role in helping to
promote the dignity of veterans who interact with this system.144 A
deadline would also promote a sense of the system’s basic fairness and
transparency.145
The prior sections previewed the additional justifications for
imposing a statutory deadline. As discussed in Section IV above,
externally imposed deadlines tend to be more effective than self-
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38 C.F.R. § 20.903 (2014).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, 19 (2012) This figure is tabulated by
identifying the average number of days (287) in FY 2012 to decide a disability
claim. That number has then added to the average numbers of days in FY 2012
to issue a statement of the case following receipt of a notice of disagreement
(270 days), the average number of days to certify an appeal to the BVA
following receipt of a substantive appeal request (692 days), and the average
number of days for the BVA to issue a decision after receipt of a certified appeal
(251 days).
See generally The American Legion Before the Committee on Veterans Affairs
United States Senate on Pending Legislation, 113th Cong. 19-21 (2013)
(statement of Ian De Planque, deputy of American Legislative Commission on
S. 928: Claims Processing Improvement Act of 2013).
See generally id.
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imposed deadlines because of basic human psychology. Moreover, the
incentives created by externally-imposed rather than internallygenerated deadlines can affect the behavior of agencies in similar
ways. Even when external deadlines have the force of law, compliance
does not reach 100%—a fact confirmed by looking to SNAP. But the
point remains—and the VA experience bears this out—internal
deadlines are too easily manipulated and evaded.
The external imposition of a clear and stable deadline for deciding
claims can also encourage more effective long-range planning at VA.
The backlog at VA grew because the agency suffered from longsimmering systems defects and was ill prepared for the perhaps
predictable combination of factors that conspired to overwhelm the
agency.146 Knowing that it could always adjust upward its timeliness
goals for a given year—something that the agency did with great
frequency—no doubt influenced VA’s deployment of resources in one
direction or another as it sought to put out various fires in the system.
Adopting a firm deadline for deciding claims can provide a powerful
framework for more effective long-range planning.147 VA must apply
lessons learned from the recent backlog crisis to avoid future backlogs
in light of the growing needs of aging veterans, the likelihood of new
conflicts, advances in medicine, greater understanding of
environmental risks to servicemembers, and other contingencies.
A statutory deadline for deciding claims can increase Congress’s
ability to conduct meaningful oversight of VA. Rather than the shifting
agency-created timeliness goals of the past decades, Congress would
have a single and stable benchmark by which to assess VA’s
effectiveness over the long term and from administration to
administration. To be sure, what Congress does with that information
is critical; if VA does not meet its statutory obligations, Congress must
do more than criticize VA in the media and during oversight hearings.
But it seems only logical that—after years of wrestling with the VA
backlog—the starting point for Congress should be declaring what it
means for VA to make a timely decision on a disability claim.148

146

147
148

See generally DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO
ELIMINATE THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS BACKLOG, supra note 79, at 3-4.
See Battling the Backlog, supra note 19, at 40-42.
This point echoes an argument advanced by James Ridgway that when courts
are confronted with unconstitutional delays in the adjudication of claims by a
federal agency, they should issue “blunt, timeline-based” remedies and then
allow the agency to determine how it will comply using the expertise the agency

2014

Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog

89

Congress would also expand the available tools for enforcement by
establishing a statutory deadline for deciding service-connected
disability compensation claims. As Section V above discussed,
veterans have few, if any, meaningful mechanisms for policing delays
at VA. At present, the primary tool for policing delays is political
oversight, which has hardly been effective. If Congress created a
statutory deadline for deciding claims, veterans could enforce that
deadline through direct administrative and judicial appeals—much in
the same way SNAP applicants can seek to enforce the thirty-day
processing deadline to which SNAP is subject. Veterans could also
presumably continue to seek relief in the CAVC via petitions for
extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act.149
Even if one accepts all of these rationales for a statutory deadline
at face value, numerous concerns can certainly be raised about the
proposal’s potential shortcomings. The service-connected disability
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already possesses. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity,
supra note 137, at 129.
One of the many paradoxes of veterans’ benefits law is that the unidirectional
flow of deadlines occurs within a system that is otherwise intended to be
decidedly pro-veteran and non-adversarial—and where VA has a duty to assist
veterans and must provide the benefit of the doubt when deciding claims. See
Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (1999) (affirming the “strongly and
uniquely pro-claimant system of awarding benefits to veterans”); see also 38
U.S.C. § 5103A (2006) (imposing duty to assist upon VA); 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)
(2006) (setting forth benefit of the doubt requirement); see also 38 C.F.R.
§§ 20.1500 Rule 1500 (2008); see also Marcy W. Kreindler & Sarah B.
Richmond, Expedited Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA): A Balancing Act
Between Efficiency and Protecting Due Process Rights of Claimants, 2
VETERANS L. REV. 55 (2010). Notably, VA’s Expedited Claims Adjudication
Initiative Pilot Program experiments with timelines for decisions within the
adjudicative process, but it also imposes shorter deadlines upon the veteran and
contains no deadline for the regional office to issue an initial decision after
receiving a claim. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.15000-10; Marcy W. Kreindler and Sarah B.
Richmond, Expedited Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA): A Balancing Act
Between Efficiency and Protecting Due Process Rights of Claimants, 2
VETERANS L. REV. 55 (2010). For the argument that additional deadlines should
be imposed upon veterans in order to remedy the VA backlog, specifically, a
statute of repose for filing VA claims in the first instance, see David Kimball
Stephenson, Note, Economics and Austerity Relative to Veterans’ Claims and
the Veterans Appeal Process, 211 MIL. L. REV. 179 (2012). For the argument
that veterans should be allotted less time to file a notice of disagreement, see
Phyllis L. Childers, VA Disability Appeals & 38 U.S.C. § 7105: Is the One Year
Timeframe for the Filing of a Notice of Disagreement Excessive?, 1 VETERANS
L. REV. 242 (2009).
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compensation program is exceedingly complex; it might simply be
unrealistic to expect VA to decide all claims within a single deadline,
especially when one factors in the necessity of obtaining sometimes
far-flung and decades-old service and medical records and of having
the veteran complete a compensation and pension exam (or even
multiple exams) with an appropriate VA medical specialist. Moreover,
the focus on efficiency—that is, requiring VA to decide all serviceconnected claims within a certain number of days—might cause
accuracy to be sacrificed. Veterans would presumably prefer to receive
a correct decision—especially if inaccuracy trends in the direction of
denials rather than approvals of benefits—over a fast decision.
Relatedly, one might argue that the focus on efficiency on the front
end—that is, in decision making on initial claims—risks incentivizing
VA to push the delays deeper into the adjudication pipeline at the
appeal and remand stages. And if veterans are permitted to appeal a
regional office’s failure to decide a claim by the statutory deadline,
appeals and remands might simply further clog the system. Finally,
creating an administrative appeal remedy will potentially render
petitions under the All Writs Act no longer tenable because
administrative remedies for delay will theoretically now exist. In short,
the proposal offered here might make the situation at VA worse, not
better.
These are legitimate concerns worth weighing, but they do not
undermine the central logic of a statutory deadline. The concerns
should be understood in context. VA has already identified 90-125
days as the appropriate period of time to decide not just some claims,
but all claims. By imposing a statutory deadline, Congress would
therefore give current agency policy the force of law. Moreover, by
making the deadline statutory, Congress might help create a natural
check against ever-increasing complexity in the VA system. Future
changes in the system whether statutory or regulatory would need to
take into account VA’s existing duty to decide initial claims by its
statutory deadline. Moreover, VA has already announced that it can
decide all claims not only within 125 days, but do so with 98%
accuracy. It seems only logical that Congress could hold VA
accountable to that determination.
The concern about clogging the system with appeals is at its root
not really an argument against imposing a deadline on the front end; it
is an argument in favor of imposing deadlines both at the front end and
on the back end of the administrative process. To borrow again from
the SNAP context, not only are state agencies required by regulation to
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make decisions on SNAP applications within a certain number of days,
but they are also required to make decisions on SNAP administrative
appeals within a certain number of days.150 For the purpose of clarity,
this essay chose to focus on initial decisions on claims; but there are
equally valid reasons for Congress to impose deadlines at other stages
of the administrative process. Indeed, there may be compelling reasons
to think imposing deadlines at multiple points in the system will be
more effective than imposing deadlines at a single step.
And as to the final set of concerns, the burdens created by
multiplying appeals should only be a decisive factor if the net result of
having imposed a statutory deadline is greater delay, not less delay. So
the question becomes one of degree, rather than whether more appeals
will create any additional administrative burdens. Moreover, petitions
for writs for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act are not widely
utilized by veterans at present because of the existing barriers to
bringing such issues to the CAVC. So, perhaps not much will be lost
theoretically if petitions for writs are more difficult to file or more
difficult to win. More substantively, it may be possible to argue to the
CAVC that the availability of an administrative appeal is not fatal to a
petition either because such an appeal is inadequate given the
underlying right at stake and/or that irreparable injury to the veteran
would occur in the absence of writ.151 One should think that with the
150
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7 C.F.R. § 273.15(c) (2014) (requiring state agencies to conduct appeal hearings,
issue decisions, and notify affected parties all within sixty days of the date the
appeal was filed). The point here is not that Congress should borrow the
deadlines (including the specific number of days) applicable to SNAP and apply
them wholesale to VA’s service-connected disability compensation program.
Rather, the point is that the type of deadlines applicable to SNAP should be
considered as potentially valuable tools for the purposes of imposing discipline
upon a poorly performing VA system. No doubt, VA’s service-connected
disability compensation program is substantially more complex than SNAP. But
that does not mean VA should be exempt from any of the types of processing
deadlines to which SNAP is subject. Instead, such processing deadlines should
be re-calibrated to the VA context.
See Kaplan v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 425, 428 (1995) (per curiam order). With the
establishment of a statutory deadline for deciding claims, it may also be possible
to argue that VA’s failure to meet that deadline violates the veteran’s right to
due process of law, which in turn would strengthen the argument that the veteran
has suffered an irreparable injury. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that right to due process of law attaches to
veterans benefits, including to applications for benefits). For a discussion of
some of the implications of the CAVC’s decision in Cushman, see Michael P.
Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell
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passion and creativity of veterans and their advocates, introducing a
statutory deadline for deciding claims would not, in the end, operate to
deprive veterans of remedies.152
VII.

CONCLUSION

Given how much frustration Congress has expressed about
systemic failures at VA, it is appropriate to look anew to Congress—as
opposed only to VA or the courts—for solutions at this particular
moment in time. This is especially so, given the way existing statutes
and doctrines have combined to deprive veterans of meaningful
administrative and judicial enforcement tools to address delays at VA.
Imposing statutory deadlines upon VA for issuing decisions in the
service-connected disability compensation program is one potential
reform Congress should consider. In doing so, Congress would be well
advised to consider how and when deadlines are deployed in other
large-scale government entitlement programs, including programs
such as SNAP, that might otherwise appear too dissimilar to the VA
disability program to warrant comparison. Taking into account social
science research about the effect of different kinds of deadlines in
different contexts and about participant assessments of procedural
justice within adjudication systems can be valuable to this effort.
The reform proposed here has admittedly only been sketched out in
broad strokes. Substantively, it is a modest reform in many respects; it
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Us about the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501 (2012). For the
argument that the Due Process Clause should not apply to applications for
veterans benefits, only receipt of benefits, see Emily Woodward Deutsch &
Robert James Burriesci, Due Process in the Wake of Cushman v. Shinseki: The
Inconsistency of Extending a Constitutionally Protected Property Interest to
Applicants for Veterans’ Benefits, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 220 (2011).
For a discussion of judicial remedies for agency failure to comply with deadlines
in contexts outside of veterans’ benefits, see Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PENN. LAW REV. 923, 95070 (2008). In considering how to enforce a statutory deadline against VA, the
SNAP analogy certainly has its limits. Advocates for SNAP applicants can sue
state agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for systemic violations of SNAP’s timely
processing requirements. Section 1983 is obviously not available for suits
against VA. As discussed above in Section V, the current judicial enforcement
tools in the VA context are much more circumscribed. Whether or not Congress
imposes adjudication deadlines against VA, the time is also ripe for Congress to
expand the CAVC’s statutory authority to entertain enforcement suits, including
aggregate litigation.
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is far from a cure-all for delay. And it does not reflect a large-scale
overhaul of the basic structure of a VA system that is antiquated in
many ways. But it does reflect certain fundamental values that should
animate any reforms to the VA system, whether large scale or small
scale: expanding enforcement tools, applying lessons learned from
past VA failures, and treating veterans with dignity.

